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Abstract
This paper presents a simple stochastic model of proportionate growth to describe in-
ternational trade and it applies this set-up to the relationship between export dynamics
and economic development. Trade flows are assumed to grow as a geometric Brownian
motion while new trade links follow a preferential attachment mechanism, and these two
processes are assumed to be independent. This simple set-up accurately describes many of
the empirical features that characterize the structure and growth of the international trade
network. Furthermore, it reconciles diverging views of industrial policy in the economic
development literature: although export is very concentrated so that large bilateral flows
are rare, countries characterized by a large number of export relations are more likely to
capture such “big hits”. The stochastic model provides a simple benchmark against which
we can assess countries’ export performance. We then investigate the determinants of de-
viation of empirical data from the predictions of the model in terms of the number of “big
hits”.
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1 Introduction
The use of industrial policy as an instrument of export growth has more than often solicited
scepticism or even strong opposition in mainstream economics (Stiglitz et al., 2013). The stan-
dard argument is based on the view that any government intervention is likely to breed ineffi-
ciency and encourage rent-seeking behaviour. Growth models formalising the supremacy of a
liberal over a closed-economy have further led economists and policy makers to have greater
recourse to markets to redress the economy. However, the free play of markets has not always
produced the desired results; for instance, ardent reform in Latin America did not improve
their performance by the 1990s. Contrarily, increased state-involvement in other economies
has sometimes led to greater economic success, such as, in Japan. As a result of these dis-
crepancies, development economists have recently revived the debate regarding the actual and
potential economic merits of industrial policy. We particularly refer to the debate confronting
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) to Easterly et al. (2009).
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and subsequent literature (Rodrik, 2004; Hausmann and Ro-
drik, 2005) provide a formalism of the case for industrial policy through a process they call
“self-discovery”, where investors learn what they are good at producing among the wide set of
investment possibilities. Once an investor discovers what products would bring the highest re-
turns, this knowledge generates positive spillovers in the economy as it signals other investors
where to direct their entrepreneurial efforts. While these informational externality is good for
the economy, it discourages initial investment. Consequently, investment is under-supplied or,
in other words, there is too little “search” and “discovery”. Hence, these authors argue that
there is a need for some optimal industrial policy to counteract this distortion. It is made clear
in Rodrik (2004) that industrial policy is not about imposing taxes or subsidies but it refers to a
greater collaboration between the state and the private sector so as to discover what investment
decision would benefit the economy and what kind of intervention is needed or not. In sum,
industrial policy is simply the “provision of public goods for the productive sector”, such as
R&D, infrastructure and training (p.39). In Hausmann and Rodrik (2005), they emphasise that
the focus is on process rather than on specific policies, in their words “[i]n view of the inherent
uncertainty about what is likely to work, it is more important to design robust institutional
arrangements than to adopt an agenda of specific policy actions. The process of self-discovery
is as much about policy learning–which types of policies work and which do not under existing
realities–as it is about entrepreneurial learning” (p.77).
On the other side of the debate, Easterly et al. (2009) contend that policy aimed at “pick-
ing winners”–selective industrial policy–is bound to be unsuccessful.1 They build their argu-
ment on the fact that manufacturing exports are highly concentrated where a few product-
destinations account for a disproportionately large share of export values. These few exports
that make up most of total export value are termed “big hits”; they capture both the right prod-
uct and the right market. With such specialisation, the shape of the distribution of exports is
highly skewed (close to being a power law) which implies that the probability of identifying a
“big hit” is very low, as this probability decreases exponentially with the size of the hit. Hence,
these authors claim that it is better to leave markets unhindered by policy. Nevertheless, they
1The authors document that manufacturing export success is intricately related to development success.
1
do mention that in the presence of externalities, “discovery efforts” could be subsidised while
letting the market “pick winners” and, hence, getting the best of both worlds.
In this paper, we show that our modelling strategy nicely accommodates the “two worlds”–
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) versus Easterly et al. (2009) as it is able to account for several
stylised facts simultaneously. While the distribution of exports is fat-tailed, i.e. “big hits” are
rare events, the probability of drawing a large export flow increases with the number of trade
relationships. This follows that countries characterised by large “discovery efforts”, stimulated
or not through industrial policy, are much more likely to draw “big hits”.
We describe international trade as a set of transactions of different magnitude occurring
between countries using a simple stochastic model of proportionate growth and we apply
this set-up to describe the relationship between export dynamics and economic development.
Stochastic models have long been used in the literature to assess the economic relevance of a
given phenomenon and to establish a benchmark for measuring its extent (Simon, 1955; Si-
mon and Ijiri, 1977). More recently, Ellison and Glaeser (1997), propose a stochastic process
whereby firms choose their location by throwing darts on a map; they compare this measure
with the observed level of geographic concentration of economic activities. The balls-and-bins
model of Armenter and Koren (2010) probably represents the closest approach to our own.
These authors describe US exports as balls falling into bins of different sizes each representing
a product-destination pair and their simple set-up is able to predict the pattern of zero-trade
flows at the extensive margin and to match some stylised facts of US trade flows. They argue
that such a model can be more informative to theory when it misses an empirical fact rather
than when it succeeds to match it. The present paper departs from Armenter and Koren (2010)
by focusing on global trade rather than just US trade with the rest of the world. Our model is
also able to match many of the stylised facts regarding international trade both at the intensive
and extensive margins.
One of the facts that is recurrent in many trade studies and relevant to this paper is the large
share of zeros in trade. Such sparsity has been documented by Helpman et al. (2008) who using
data for 158 countries for the period 1970-1997 report that about only 50% of country-pairs
engage in trade. Similarly, Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), describing US trade at the 10-digit
Harmonised System, find that zeros are as present in import as in export data, making up
about 82% of the latter. Both papers build on the heterogeneous firms trade model of Melitz
(2003) which they improve to account for the share of zeros and other trade patterns. Second,
we refer to the literature which report the high concentration of trade both at the intensive
(the value of trade) and extensive margin (the number of trade relationships). These facts are
well-documented in Easterly et al. (2009). They find that the top 1% export products accounts
for 49% of the median export share. At the intensive margin, they report that the top 1%
product-destination makes up about 53% of the median export value. Trade concentration
seems to have been here for long; investigating the role of distance and the patterns of intra-
European trade, Beckerman (1956) stresses the non-normal distribution of trade where trade
accumulates at the extremities instead of around the mean. He finds that on average each
country exported about 56% of its total export to its 3 major markets in 1938 and about 50%
in 1953.
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Another pattern closely related to trade concentration is the observation that most countries
export only a few products to a few destinations while a small club of countries export most
products to many destinations (Riccaboni and Schiavo, 2010). Similarly, the distribution of
bilateral trade values is highly skewed assuming a log-normal form (Bhattacharya et al., 2008;
Fagiolo et al., 2009) and this shape holds for different level of aggregation of the data. Here
too, a small fraction of very large trade relationships exists alongside a large number of small
trade flows.
Hence, skewness is evident both at the intensive and at the extensive margin. There is
extensive debate and disagreement in recent trade literature as to what role do the intensive
and extensive margins play in trade growth. While some papers find that the extensive margin
drives trade growth (Hummels and Klenow, 2005), other authors report the dominant role of
the intensive margin (Besedeš and Prusa, 2011). In fact, the extensive margin seems to exert
a greater influence on trade at the cross-sectional level, for instance, Hummels and Klenow
(2005) find that it accounts for 60% of export. On the contrary, the intensive margin explains
most of the dynamics of trade over time. Helpman et al. (2008) report that the rapid growth
of world trade since the 1970s was mostly trade between existing countries rather than with
new partners. Similarly, Besedeš and Prusa (2011) emphasise the temporal nature of extensive
trade in export growth so that extensive trade has no effect in the long-term.
While there is a largely held view and empirical evidence that diversification of exports
is positively related to economic development, Cadot et al. (2009) and previously Imbs and
Wacziarg (2003) find that there is an increase in concentration at higher level of development.
They show that most of the action happen at the extensive margin by using the Theil Index
of concentration. The latter is an interesting measure as it can be decomposed additively into
a between-group and a within-group components. Changes in the between-group component
can be matched into changes in the extensive margin of trade while changes in the within-
group component can be mapped into changes in the intensive margin of trade. This property
is explained and proved by Cadot et al. (2009).
We also draw from studies that explore the dependency of growth rates on size of firms.
Stanley et al. (1996) find that the variances of growth rates differ with firms of different sizes
and decreases with larger sizes. Indeed, the distribution of growth rates is not Gaussian but
rather exponential. The same holds for the size of an economy as reported in Canning et al.
(1998) and for many other economic phenomena. Plotting the log of the standard deviation of
firms’ growth rate against the log of their initial sales value, a power-law relationship emerges.
This result challenges beliefs that volatility in growth rates decreases quickly with size.
Among other branches of research, we refer much to development literature that attempt
to explain export success, or in our case, the identification of “big hits”. We look into the
literature on country capabilities which contends that economic development rests on both
tradable and non-tradable capabilities present in a country (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009;
Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2011). Further, we draw from literature that stresses the importance
of financial development, institutions and geography in economic performance.
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2 The model
We describe international trade as a set of links (bilateral transactions) of different magnitude
occurring among pair of nodes (countries). Consistently with the empirical analysis, we define
a trade link as a product-destination pair. We assume the binary structure of trade (i.e. the
presence/absence of a link between two specific countries and the number of links maintained
by each country) is governed by a process of “preferential attachment”: countries establish new
trade links based on the number of connection they already have. Hence, more active exporters
are more likely to export new products and/or reach new markets.2
Apart from being remarkably consistent with a large number of empirical networks, this
mechanism of network formation and growth is consistent with the notion that exporting rep-
resents a key engine of economic growth thanks to the endogenous forces set in motion by
learning effects in the manufacturing sector (Kaldor, 1957). More recent framings of this view
of cumulative causations are the “self-discovery” story presented by Hausmann and Rodrik
(2003) and the “complexity” approach proposed by (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). The for-
mer postulates that attempts to set up new businesses and export new products to new destina-
tions generate valuable public information as they signal profitable opportunities or dead ends.
The latter builds on the notion that by producing a given set of goods each country cumulates
a number of capabilities: the more capabilities are present, the easier it is to recombine them
and put them to a novel use. Microfounded accounts of preferential attachment are offered
by Chaney (2011) and Krautheim (2012). The first assumes that firms can establish links with
suppliers either at random or via existing connections (meeting friends of friends); the second
models the fixed costs associated with penetrating a foreign market as a decreasing function of
the number of firms already exporting there (from a given source country) due to the presence
of spillover effects.
Building on the extension to weighted networks proposed by Riccaboni and Schiavo (2010)
we assume that, while the binary structure of international trade follows a purely preferential
attachment mechanism, the dollar value of each trade flow grows according to a geometric
Brownian motion. Moreover, the two processes governing the formation of links and their
growth are assumed to be independent.
More formally, we can describe the stochastic model as follows:
- at time t = 0 there are N0 countries each characterized by a self loop;3
- at each time step t = {1, . . . ,T }, a new link among two countries arises: thus the number
of links existing at time t is mt = t;
We identify the number of links of country i at time t with Ki(t), whereas Kij(t) represents the
number of products traded between countries i and j. To identify the countries connected to
each link we adopt the following procedure:
2Preferential attachment is typically associated with the pioneering work by Barabási and Albert (1999) and
gives rise to a very skewed connectivity distributions (few well-connected nodes coexist alongside a large number
of peripheral actors), which is found to characterize many real-world applications beside trade (the internet, world-
wide air trasportation, mobile communication, interbank payments to quote just a few; see Faloutsos et al., 1999;
Guimera et al., 2005; Onnela et al., 2007; Soram aki et al., 2007).
3This only serves for initialization purpose: self loops are never considered in the analysis.
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• with probability a the new link is assigned to a new country, whereas with probability
1− a it is allocated to an existing country;
• in the latter case, the probability of choosing country i is given by pi(t) = Ki(t − 1)/2t; i.e.
the probability depends on the number of links already secured by country i;
• the same process governs both side of the trade link, meaning that the two partner coun-
tries are chosen symmetrically with i , j;
Hence, at each time t this set of rules identifies the pair of (distinct) countries to be linked and
the process generates the binary structure of the network, meaning the number of active bilat-
eral links, the number of zero trade flows, the number of links associated with each country.
For what concerns the value of each trade flow, we assume that it grows in time according
to a simple random process:
• at time t each (existing) trade flow between countries i and j has weight wij(t) > 0;4
• at time t + 1 the weight of each link is increased or decreased by a random shock xij(t),
so that wij(t + 1) = wij(t)xij(t). All we need to assume is that the shocks and initial link
values are taken from a distribution with finite mean and standard deviation.5
We therefore combine a preferential attachment mechanism, with an independent geomet-
ric Brownian motion characterizing the magnitude of bilateral trade flows. As detailed in
Riccaboni and Schiavo (2010), this simple setup gives rise to very skewed distributions that
are consistent with the empirical evidence. In particular, in the limit of large t, with a > 0
and small, the connectivity distribution converges to a power-law with an exponential cutoff
(Yamasaki et al., 2006). For what concerns the distribution of bilateral trade flows, the pro-
portional growth process described above implies that the distribution of the weights P (w)
converges to a lognormal.
We do not regard this setup as a full-fledged economic model that explains bilateral trade
flows, but rather as a stochastic benchmark against which to compare actual data.
3 Data and Empirics
3.1 Data
We use data on bilateral trade flows contained in the BACI dataset that reconciles data reported
by exporting and importing countries to the United Nations Statistics Division.6 The bilateral
trade flows we use in the present paper cover a maximum of 194 countries and 5039 product
categories at the 6-digit Harmonised System(HS) level. We clean the data for very small coun-
tries (such as the Cook Islands) for which data are sparse and not reliable, and end up with a
dataset covering 186 countries over a 15-year period between 1995 and 2009.
4We further assume that Ki , Kj and wij are independent random variables, i.e. the value of bilateral trade is
independent of the connectivity of the two partner countries.
5So in principle the initial value of trade could be 1, or can be defined in terms of some exogenous determinant
such as size and distance, as in a standard gravity model.
6For more information on the construction of BACI, refer to Gaulier and Zignago (2010).
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3.2 Regularities in empirical data
As mentioned previously, sparsity of trade is one of the most documented stylised facts re-
garding bilateral trade flows. We also find in our data that the number of active trade links is
far below the potential one. Over the period 1995-2009, in terms of aggregate trade flows to a
destination, the average share of zeros is about 47%, and the highest share of 57% is in 1995.
Since many products are exported to just one or few destinations, we also look at the share of
zeros at the product-destination level and the average is as high as 97%. As shown in figure 1,
both shares exhibit a declining trend over the years, except in 2009, but remain high.
Figure 1 Share of zero trade flows at the products and product-destinations level
Focusing now on active trade links, we look at the distribution of the number of trade
relationships (at the product-destination level) maintained by each country. Figure 2 shows
such distributions for the years 2000 (panel a) and 2005 (panel b). These distributions are
well approximated by a Pareto in the body (the straight line behaviour is apparent in the plot),
with an an exponential cut-off in the upper tail, where the number of product-destinations is
very large. This departure is magnified in the inset (in semi-log-scale) of the figures where the
exponential part now appears as a straight line. This behaviour conforms to the prediction of
our model.
We also expect the distribution of trade values to be log-normally distributed as implied
by the Gibrat process of proportionate growth driving the intensive margin. Figure 3 a) shows
the complementary cumulative distribution function of manufacturing trade for both bilateral
trade values and total trade values, i.e., total trade values of country i, together with the log-
normal estimates for the year 2005. The log-normal estimates are calculated using maximum
likelihood for truncated data.7 Figure b) shows the probability-probability plot using least-
square estimation method. The distributions of trade values is fat-tailed and in the aggregate
the lognormal estimates provide a good fit. Using the method of least-square a log-normal
distribution fits well even the disaggregated data as shown in figure 3 b).
The data also show the striking degree of specialisation in exports. For example, in 2005,
the median export shares for the top 20%, 10% and 1% products are 97%, 93% and 66% re-
7See Bee (2006).
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(a) Year 2000
(b) Year 2005
Figure 2 Connectivity distributions at HS6: Main plot in double log and inset in semi-log
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3 Distributions of bilateral and total manufacturing trade flows and lognormal fits
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spectively as shown in table 1. The median share for just the top 3 products is as high as
42%. A comparison of the 2005 figures with those of 1995 show that export concentration has
increased slightly over time. Concentration at the product-destination level is very high and
increases over time. At low levels, such as, for the top 10 or top 3 products the figures are lower
than those at the product level since there are many more product-destinations than products.8
Table 1 Export share for the year 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2009 (top 20% stands for top 20
percent and top 10 stands for top 10 products)
Share of exports by products
Year 1995 mean p50 sd min max Year 2000 mean p50 sd min max
top 20% 94.7 96.9 6.7 54.8 99.9 top 20% 95.1 96.9 5.7 58.5 100
top 10% 89 92.3 10.7 35.5 99.8 top 10% 89.8 92.6 9.9 34.3 100
top 1% 59.9 59.4 20.3 9.2 97.7 top 1% 62.2 61.3 19.7 14.1 100
top 10 61.9 65.6 28.1 10.4 100 top 10 62.3 63.7 26.1 12.1 100
top 3 45.5 40.1 28.5 4.2 100 top 3 45.1 40.2 26.8 5 100
top 1 28.3 20.4 23.6 1.7 97.4 top 1 28.7 20.5 23.7 1.8 100
Year 2005 mean p50 sd min max Year 2009 mean p50 sd min max
top 20% 95.8 97.2 5.2 60.1 100 top 20% 96.8 97.6 3.1 76 100
top 10% 91.2 93.4 8.2 49.6 99.9 top 10% 92.9 93.9 5.6 59.6 100
top 1% 65.5 65.5 18.9 16.4 99.5 top 1% 66 65.5 14.5 13.6 95.6
top 10 62 62.8 26.2 12.3 100 top 10 46.9 43.9 28 3.4 97.9
top 3 45.7 41.9 27.5 6.5 100 top 3 30 25 22.4 1.4 94.9
top 1 28.9 20.9 23.8 2.9 98.2 top 1 16.8 13.2 15.8 0.5 86.7
Share of exports by product-destinations
Year 1995 mean p50 sd min max Year 2000 mean p50 sd min max
top 20% 95 96.1 6.2 54.8 99.8 top 20% 95.6 96.8 5.2 58.4 100
top 10% 89.4 91.2 9.4 35.5 99.4 top 10% 90.7 92.3 8.9 34.3 100
top 1% 58.6 58.8 16.3 9.2 97.4 top 1% 62 60.4 16.5 14.1 100
top 10 47.5 43.5 29 3 100 top 10 47.4 44.5 28 3.3 100
top 3 31.4 22.9 24.8 1.3 100 top 3 30.8 23.6 23.8 1.3 100
top 1 17.6 11 17.9 0.5 97.4 top 1 17.2 11.9 17.7 0.6 100
Year 2005 mean p50 sd min max Year 2009 mean p50 sd min max
top 20% 96.5 97.3 4.4 60.1 100 top 20% 96.8 97.6 3.1 76 100
top 10% 92.6 93.7 6.6 49.6 99.9 top 10% 92.9 93.9 5.6 59.6 100
top 1% 66.5 65.1 14.8 16.4 96.8 top 1% 66 65.5 14.5 13.6 95.6
top 10 46.6 42.9 27.9 2.9 100 top 10 46.9 43.9 28 3.4 97.8
top 3 30.6 24.6 23.6 1.2 100 top 3 30 25 22.4 1.4 94.9
top 1 17.2 11.1 16.7 0.5 90.3 top 1 16.8 13.2 15.8 0.5 86.7
Share of exports by destinations
Year 1995 mean p50 sd min max Year 2000 mean p50 sd min max
top 20% 92.3 93.3 5.3 71.6 100 top 20% 92.9 94 5.5 63.5 100
top 10% 80.8 81.9 9.9 52.4 100 top 10% 82.9 83.9 9 50.8 100
top 1% 39.9 35.8 20 11.4 100 top 1% 41.2 36.1 18.8 13.1 100
top 10 84.3 83.7 11.3 59.6 100 top 10 82.4 82.7 11.8 53.6 100
top 3 59.7 57 19.2 27.2 100 top 3 57.6 53.5 19.5 24.1 100
top 1 36 30.5 21.2 11.4 100 top 1 35.1 28.6 20.9 10.3 100
Year 2005 mean p50 sd min max Year 2009 mean p50 sd min max
top 20% 93.7 94.5 4.2 71.6 99.6 top 20% 93.5 94.1 4.3 63.7 100
top 10% 83.5 84.1 7.9 55.1 97.9 top 10% 83 83.2 8.6 39.3 100
top 1% 39.4 35.2 17.3 14.3 97.6 top 1% 39.1 34.4 18 15.1 100
top 10 80.6 81.4 11.9 51.4 100 top 10 80.2 81.2 13.1 49.4 100
top 3 54.8 50.9 18.3 21.8 100 top 3 54.6 50.8 19.4 22.5 100
top 1 32.2 25.2 19.1 8 97.6 top 1 32.1 24.5 19.9 8.6 100
8Our figures are higher than those reported by Easterly et al. (2009). They restrict their analysis to manufac-
turing exports, thus dropping export of natural resources which is dependent on a country’s endowments and
therefore inflate concentration. For comparative purposes, we also consider the restricted sample of manufacturing
exports for the year 2000 (the same used by Easterly et al., 2009): as we expected, we obtain lower concentration
figures than using the whole sample, and figures that are even lower than those reported by Easterly et al. (2009).
This may be due to the fact that their dataset contains fewer categories of products (2950) and fewer countries (151)
than ours.
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Table 2 further investigates the issue of concentration by reporting the standard concen-
tration indices.9 Except for the Herfindahl index, the Gini, relative entropy and Theil index,
all show that export is highly concentrated and confirm the previous findings. The Theil can
be decomposed additively into a between- and a within-group component: the former reflects
changes in the extensive margin of trade while the latter mirrors the behaviour of the intensive
margin (Cadot et al., 2009). Results (not displayed) confirm the findings obtained by Cadot
et al. (2009): diversification appears to be mainly driven by the extensive margin. Further-
more, while at the intensive margin there is a positive relation between the Theil index and
GDP per capita (concentration increases with income), at the extensive margin this relation-
ship is U-shaped.
Table 2 Concentration indices and descriptive statistics
mean st. dev. min max obs.
Gini 0.998 0.004 0.977 1.000 194
Entropy 0.639 0.150 0.291 0.893 194
Theil 8.823 2.074 4.022 12.327 194
Herfindahl 0.079 0.098 0.000 0.470 194
Finally, figure 4 shows the relationship between connectivity (the extensive margin) and the
value of bilateral trade flows (intensive margin) for manufacturing exports on a log-log scale.
A positive relationship emerges with the coefficient of the interpolating line being θ ≈ 1.32 for
W = Kθ for the year 2005.10 In economic terms, a θ > 1 implies a positive relationship between
the extensive and the intensive margin so that countries entertaining a larger number of trade
links feature higher average and total trade. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that
the extensive margin plays a prominent role in explaining cross-country differences in total
exports (Hummels and Klenow, 2005) and with the findings reported in Easterly et al. (2009).
4 Big hits
In this section, we lay down our contribution to the debate regarding the role of industrial
policy in export success. To re-frame, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) regard development as
a self-discovery process wherein policies are designed to discover the productive potential of
a country. Without public support, entrepreneurial activity (discovery efforts) will be under-
provided because of the non-appropriability of the returns from the investment. In fact, since
“search and discovery” provides more than just private returns, so that the knowledge that is
produced tends to spillover to the whole economy, other entrepreneurs can exploit the infor-
mation and the returns to the society are larger than private returns. This entails a market
failure and call for public intervention.
This idea is well captured by our preferential attachment assumption which can be inter-
preted in the following way: countries that make a successful discovery are more likely to
9We calculated these indices for both the empirical and theoretical maximum number of product-destinations.
The theoretical statistics do not differ much from the empirical ones because the theoretical maximum number of
product-destinations is not very different from its empirical counterpart (5039 and 5014 respectively) The table
only shows the empirical results.
10This coefficient increases over time (results are not reported here).
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Figure 4 Relationship between the intensive and extensive margin
discover in the future. That is to say, the probability of capturing a new export link is increas-
ing in the number of links already established. This also means that discovery costs will be
spread over more products or links, hence, further encouraging initial investment.
Figure 5 Big Hits versus number of product-destinations flows (K) – empirical and predicted
values (year 2005)
Although Easterly et al. (2009) are of the view that a strategy of “picking winners” is un-
likely to be successful, we argue that the role of industrial policy is to stimulate as much search
as is optimally desirable. As Easterly et al. (2009) contends, we agree that “big hits” are rare
11
Table 3 Descriptive statistics: predicted and empirical Big Hits
Predicted Empirical
No. of Countries 187 187
Mean 92 49
Std. Dev. 177 165
Max. 928 1182
1st Quartile 3 0
Median 12 1
3rd Quartile 96 11
No. of big hits = 0 11 72
No. of big hits = 1 19 23
No. of big hits < 20 107 146
No. of big hits > 200 32 15
No. of big hits > 500 12 7
events. This follows from the skewness of the distribution of export values. However, we fo-
cus on the fact there exists a more than proportional relationship between the extensive (the
number of export links) and the intensive margin of trade (export values) as shown in figure
4. It follows that the probability of drawing a large flow increases with the number of trade
relationships. The more a country searches, the more likely it is to discover a successful export
link. As such, policies that stimulate “search” (the establishment of as many links as possible)
and “discovery” efforts (the identification of a big hit) would be beneficial for development.
To prove our argument, we plot the number of big hits against the number of product-
destinations as shown in figure 5 and we note the positive relationship. An export value, wij is
defined as a big hit if wij > three standard deviations from the mean export value.11 The figure
also shows the simulated big hits which we obtained by counting the number of big hits from
drawing a hundred simulations from a log-normal distribution with the empirical parameters.
Thus, we can compare how the observed data deviate from the simulated benchmark. Table 3
reports the descriptive statistics which show that on average the actual data have less big hits
than the simulated benchmark and the actual data have 61 more countries with zero big hits.
4.1 Big hits in the world and in Europe
Table 4 lists the 13 countries that are doing better than what the model predicts. Of those
countries that have more than a 100 “big hits”, Japan exceeds the model prediction by a re-
markable 83% and Mexico by 30% respectively. Germany and Ireland are the only European
countries with positive deviations. On the other side, there are many more countries (159) that
fall short of the benchmark (see list of all countries in appendix A.2, these include countries
such as Italy, Spain, Turkey and Singapore. Table 5 shows the position of the EU countries.
In terms of percentage deviation from the benchmark, the Baltic countries perform poorly
with both Lithuania and Latvia having a single empirical big hit much less than their simu-
lated benchmark. They are small economies, hence, they have a limited market size. Despite
their recent integration to the EU, they are technologically less-advanced than most developed
11While Easterly et al. (2009) imply that a big hit is a large export value, they do not provide a definition of big
hits.
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Table 4 List of countries doing better than the benchmark (year 2005)
Country Empirical Predicted Deviations
China 1182 928 254
USA 1079 860 219
Germany 1072 902 170
Japan 876 478 398
Canada 326* 309 17
Mexico 236 181 55
Ireland 166 135 31
Zambia 8* 5 3
Bahamas 4* 3 1
Mozambique 4* 3 1
Liberia 3 1 2
Cayman Isds 2* 1 1
Marshall Isds 2* 1 1
Note: * indicates that the empirical values fall within the
95% CI of the simulated big hits
countries. Their economic structure is mainly agricultural and light industry, hence further
reducing their probability of having big hits in manufacturing. Most eastern European coun-
tries also lag behind their benchmark by a great deal. However, the actual big hits of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland ranks fairly well, doing even better than the advanced nation
Denmark which only has 39 empirical “big hits”. Other advanced European countries, such
as, France, Netherlands, Italy or the UK, show good performances. Greece shows a very poor
performance given its size and its high simulated benchmark.
Table 5 The European picture (2005)
Country Empirical Predicted % Dev. Country Empirical Predicted % Dev.
Germany 1072 902 19 Finland 62 213 -71
France 416 720 -42 Portugal 40 177 -77
UK 322 714 -55 Denmark 39 313 -88
Italy 307 787 -61 Slovakia 24 114 -79
Netherlands 267 543 -51 Romania 19 124 -85
Belgium-Lux 240 514 -53 Slovenia 8 126 -94
Ireland 166 135 23 Malta 6 19 -68
Spain 150 529 -72 Croatia 3 69 -96
Sweden 119 353 -66 Greece 3 133 -98
Austria 81 359 -77 Estonia 2 60 -97
Hungary 71 170 -58 Latvia 1 52 -98
Poland 70 251 -72 Lithuania 1 83 -99
Czech Rep. 67 256 -74 Cyprus 0 27 -100
None of the country’s empirical values fall within the 95% CI of the predicted values
4.2 Big Hits, concentration and export volatility
From a policy perspective it is not clear whether governments or policymakers should pay
attention to the number of big hits, and if so why. After all, one could argue that countries
may be better off with a larger number of “average” flows rather than a small number of very
large ones. In this section we investigate the matter by looking at the relationship between a
13
country’s performance in terms of big hits (defined as the distance between their actual and
predicted number), export diversification, and export volatility.
Figure 6 Left panel: Export concentration (Theil index) and Big Hits deviations. Right panel:
Standard deviation of export annual growth rate and Big Hits deviations. Both panels are in
double log scale.
The left panel of Figure ?? displays the relationship between BH deviations (i.e. the dif-
ference between the actual and the predicted number of big hits) and export concentration as
measured by the Theil index. The figure pools all years together and adds a nonparametric
local smoother (Lowess) to the data. Since we use a double log scale, we take the absolute
value of deviations (where a negative number signals that a country has fewer large flows than
our model predicts) and distinguish between observations where the deviation is negative (the
vast majority of country-year observations) or positive (around 5% of the sample). No clear-cut
pattern emerges from the data, with concentration indexes spread widely at each level of BH
deviation. If anything, a clearer picture appears at relatively large values of negative devia-
tions: when the data fall severely short of predictions, there is a positive relationship between
the number of “missing” big hits and concentration. Intuitively, this suggests that when coun-
tries are characterized by a very low number of big hits, their exports tend to be concentrated.
To dig deeper we run a regression of the (log of the) Theil concentration index computed
across product-destination pairs on (the log of) big hits deviation in absolute terms: to accom-
modate for the fact that we have both negative and positive deviations we run a fully inter-
acted model where positive deviations are identified by a dummy (Dpos). Results are reported
in Table 6, column 1. There is a positive relationship between BH deviations and export con-
centration for country-years where the data fall short of the model predictions (suggesting that
a lower number of big hits is associated with higher concentration). The relationship turns
negative when we consider positive deviations, i.e. observations for which the actual number
of big hits is larger than the model predicts. In this case, a better performance is associated
with lower concentration.
This result is robust to the use of a different measure of concentration, namely the normal-
ized Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index (see columns 2–3 of Tables 6). In this case, however,
it is necessary to control for the size of the country or, better, for the number of product-
destination flows exported (Ki). This is because as the number of items across which the HH
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index is computed grows, its value goes down mechanically. This is not the case for the Theil
index, which is both scale and population independent.
Table 6 Deviations in Big Hits (empirical Vs predicted), export diversification and export
volatility
Concentration Stand. deviation of
Theil Index Herfindahl export growth
log(BH dev.) 0.009*** -0.005*** 0.014*** -0.082*** 0.085***
[0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.007] [0.017]
Dpos× log(BH dev.) -0.012* -0.002 -0.008***
[0.007] [0.001] [0.003]
log(Ki) -0.015*** -0.128***
[0.001] [0.012]
Dpos× log(Ki) 0.004**
[0.002]
Observations 3,179 3,178 3,178 180 180
R-squared 0.118 0.083 0.179 0.421 0.645
Coefficients for the constant term and the Dpos dummy not reported.
Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
However, export diversification per se is not necessarily a policy objective. This is espe-
cially true in our sample where we concentrate on manufacturing export and therefore exclude
natural resources and other commodities that may generate dependence and high volatility.
The main reason why export diversification is normally considered good is that is can reduce
exposure to shock, thus reducing volatility.
We address this question by looking at the relationship between BH deviations in 1995 and
the standard deviation of annual export growth between 1995 and 2011. More specifically, we
run the following regression
log(1 + std.dev((ˆXit) = β0 + β1log(1 +BHdev) + β2log(1 +Ki) + εit
where we have 1 observation for each county and the standard deviation of export growth is
computed across 16 time periods. In 1995 only 7 countries outperform the benchmark number
of big hits predicted by the model, and since this is too small to run a regression we exclude
them from the analysis and concentrate on negative deviations. When we do not control for
size (column 4) we find that initial deviations from the benchmark have a negative effect on
the variability of future growth rates: the more a country deviates from the model’s prediction,
the lower the standard deviation of growth. This counterintuitive result is reversed when we
include the number of export flows (Ki) into the analysis: since larger countries trade more they
will be simultaneously less volatile (because they are larger and more diversified) and display
larger deviations (because the predicted number of big hits depends on the number of export
flows). This negative relationship between size and volatility is depicted in the right panel of
Figure 6.
We therefore need to control for size as is done in column 5: indeed, exporting a larger
number of products and/or serving more destinations (higher Ki) lowers volatility, whereas a
worse performance in terms of big hits (a larger deviation in absolute terms) increases volatility
(β1 = 0.085 > 0).
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Hence, one possible reason of concern for countries that fall significantly short of our
stochastic benchmark is not only that this may signal possible bottlenecks and distortions in
their productive structure, but that this further results in higher volatility of future export
growth.
4.3 Potential determinants of big hits deviation
To investigate why some countries fare better while others lag behind as compared to the
benchmark, we regress the deviations in “big hits” from the simulated benchmark on a number
of potential determinants of these deviations. We get our inspiration from the industrial policy
debate and the larger development literature that tries to assess the determinants of economic
performance.
Industrial policy is a tricky term; what it implies depends much on the context. In his work,
Rodrik stresses that there is no one recipe that fits all when it comes to policy formulation.
What is understood is that the main role of industrial policy is both to inform the private sector
of externalities and to provide the optimal environment for growth through implementation of
policies. He made it clear that it cannot also be reduced to the application of taxes or subsidies.
Thus, it becomes very difficult to find a measure of industrial policy and even more challenging
to assess the impact of industrial policy on economic performance.
Even Rodrik himself warns that nothing can be learnt from regressing economic growth
or any other performance indicator on policies (Rodrik, 2012). This is because while policy
endogeneity can be dealt with, the problem lies beyond econometrics and is conceptual since
the endogeneity is an integral part of the null hypothesis. We operationalise the concept of
industrial policy through crude measures, such as, tariffs and other institutional variables,
such as, rule of law and ease-of-doing business variables.
The next set of potential determinants of big hits deviation comes from closely related lit-
erature, namely the literature on country capabilities as recently developed by Hidalgo et al.
(2007) and further explored in Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). The classical view is that the
performance of a country is dependent upon factor accumulation. Increases in total factor pro-
ductivity results in increases in income per capita. Hence, policy implies human and physical
capital accumulation. However, total factor productivity explains only a fraction of economic
performance.
According to the capability discourse the productive structure of a country depends on
the availability of a specific set of capabilities, including tradables and non tradables, such as,
norms, institutions, and social networks. Countries differ in their capabilities; high-income
ones tend to produce more varieties and more complex products, which require many capa-
bilities whereas poor countries make few and less complex products that require fewer ca-
pabilities. Countries have capabilities and products require capabilities. More sophisticated
products require a larger range of capabilities and will tend to be produced by fewer countries,
i.e. these products are less ubiquitous. They show a combination of the diversification of a
country and product ubiquity are indirect measures of a country’s capability.
Since the work of Schumpeter (1934), the role of financial development in economic growth
has received considerable scholarly attention. The latter theorises that a well-developed fi-
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nancial system nurtures innovation and economic growth by providing entrepreneurs with
the necessary conditions for success including better allocation of resources, lesser informa-
tion asymmetries and so on. Using cross-country regressions for 77 countries over the period
1960-1989, King and Levine (1993) observe a significant positive impact of financial depth on
growth. Their results are consistent with different definitions of financial depth and, more
interestingly, with different growth measures, namely, real GDP per capita growth, real per
capita capital growth and productivity growth. We, thus, include financial development vari-
ables which could potentially influence big hits.
We also include a set of network measures to assess the importance of connectivities on
deviations in big hits (Miura, 2011). Degree centrality refers to the importance of a node in
a network based on its number of connections. Closeness centrality gives higher centrality
scores to nodes that are situated closer to other nodes of their component where closeness
refers to the inverse of the average shortest paths. Betweenness centrality gives larger centrality
scores to nodes that lie on a higher proportion of shortest paths linking nodes other than itself;
in simpler terms, a node that lies on a communication path between two other nodes, is an
important node. The extent to which nodes in a network are concentrated is measured using
the clustering coefficient12.
4.4 Quantile and WALS regression
We estimate the following regression model, using quantile regression and model averaging
techniques:
BHdev.i = α + β1InitialYi + β2Sizei + βθXi + i
where InitialYi is initial GDP per capita (year 1995), Sizei is GDP in constant US$ to control
for size, and Xi is a set of controls. A full description of the variables and their sources is
reported in the appendix.
The use of quantile techniques is motivated by the shape of the distribution of the deviation
of big hits which is fat-tailed13. Quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978) differs from
standard least-square regression techniques as it allows the estimation of different quantiles
of the dependent variable, whereas standard least-square provides summary estimates that
approximate the mean effect of the dependent variable given a set of values of the independent
variables. Hence, quantile regressions provide a more complete picture of the relationship
between the response and predicted variables.
The fact that there are only 13 countries out of 188 doing better than the benchmark gives a
non-Gaussian distribution of deviations in big hits as shown in figure 7. As such, we cannot as-
sume normally distributed errors. Hence, we suspect there might be different factors working
at different portions of the distribution. It is as informative to understand what factors cause
some countries to perform badly compared to the benchmark as it is to uncover why others
excel as regards the reference point. Quantile techniques allow the estimation of coefficients
at different quantiles of the dependent variable. In our case, it allows us to acknowledge the
heterogeneity of countries in their export performance.
12See the appendix for mathematical definitions
13with a positive kurtosis of more than 13
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Figure 7 Kernel density of deviations in big hits
Furthermore, our largest deviation 398 is much larger than the mean deviation of -43. In
our case, it would be major loss of information to remove such extreme observations because
they form the basis of successes or failures in big hits. Since the objective function of a quantile
regression is a weighted sum of absolute deviations, it provides a robust measure of location
(Buchinsky, 1998). As quantile regressions are more robust to outliers and skewed distribu-
tions, it remains one of our preferred estimation technique.
Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) introduced the quantile regression model which can be writ-
ten as
yi = x
′
iβτ +uτi with Qτ (yi |xi) = x
′
iβτ (1)
where Qτ (yi |xi) is the conditional quantile of yi given the regressor xi , β is the vector of pa-
rameters to be estimated and u is a vector of residuals. The τ th regression quantile estimator is
found by minimising:
min
β
1
n
 ∑
i∈yi≥x′iβ
τ |yi − x′iβ|+
∑
i∈yi<x′iβ
(1− τ)|(yi − x′iβ|
 (2)
Linear programming is used to solve Eq. 4.4 (Buchinsky, 1994; Koenker, 2006).
Figure 8 shows the graphical results of the quantile regression for selected variables of
interest over the conditional deviation in “big hits” distribution. The horizontal lines represent
the OLS estimates. The graphs clearly shows how the effect of the different variables vary over
quantiles, for instance, as shown in figure 8a country capabilities have a negative effect at low
quantiles but a positive one for well-performing “big hits” at the upper quantile. The OLS
estimate fail to capture this effect. As for betweenness centrality, figure 8b demonstrates that
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Figure 8 Quantile results for selected variables
the OLS regression provides a misrepresentation of the variation in the variable.
While we are guided by related theory, there is no established theoretical background for
finding the best model specification for the deviations in big hits, let alone for economic perfor-
mance. Model averaging techniques are useful to overcome the uncertainty linked in finding
the “true” modelling strategy when there exists a large number of potential regressors. They
are best used as robustness check to confirm that inferences of the estimated coefficients do
not vary widely between model specifications. They aim at finding the best possible estimates
as opposed to the best possible model. As such, we also check the robustness of our results by
making use of the recent model averaging technique developed by Magnus et al. (2010), the
weighted average least square (WALS).
Model averaging, such as WALS, consists of making inferences on the estimates from all
models in a model space and the estimates are weighed according to their statistical strengths,
i.e. their posterior model probabilities. In fact, the WALS estimator is a Bayesian combination
of frequentist estimators. WALS is considered theoretically and practically superior to stan-
dard techniques such as Bayesian model averaging (BMA) as it explicitly takes into account
model uncertainty and the amount of computing time is linear in the number of regressors
rather than exponential as in standard BMA14. In fact, the WALS estimator is a Bayesian com-
bination of frequentist estimators. Explanatory variables can be distinguished between focus
and auxiliary. Focus regressors are those included on theoretical or other basis while auxiliary
regressors are those over which uncertainty exists and over which model selection takes place.
The numerical results of the different regressions are shown in table 7. Column OLS is a ro-
bust ordinary least square regression, columns Q(0.20), Q(0.50), Q(0.70), Q(0.90) are the 20%,
14See Magnus et al. (2010) and Magnus et al. (2011) for a description of the theoretical and practical superiority
of WALS over BMA.
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50%, 70% and 90% quantiles respectively. Column WALS_0 is a WALS regression with no focus
regressors, that is, we perform model selection and assume uncertainty over all the regressors.
WALS_f includes 10 focus regressors included as such based on their significance level in pre-
vious regressions;they are country capabilities, betweenness centrality, start-up costs and the
regional dummies. They are marked by (f) in the regression table 7. WALS_33 is a model with
a restricted sample of 102 observations but boasting 33 auxiliary regressors.
Table 7 Regression results, dependent variable: deviation in Big Hits
OLS Q(0.20) Q(0.50) Q(0.70) Q(0.90) WALS WALS_f WALS_33
Initial income -36.03+ -7.250* -5.502 -11.68* -15.01 -27.63+ -27.13+ -32.73
GDP 10.55 -1.251* -1.950 0.760 18.38 7.765 7.037 -5.750
Capabilities -0.123+ -0.105* -0.076 -0.065* 0.078 -0.092* -0.110* (f) -0.160*
Prod. ubiquity -7.223* -0.0616 -0.545 -0.766 -5.514 -5.837* -5.403* -3.448
Between. Centr. -29552* -20466* -11684 -11390* -27671 -23670* -24908* (f) -17444*
Clustering 89.60 25.72* 23.75 23.30 17.01 67.95 66.45 95.45
Private credit 0.486 -0.366* -0.106 0.0915 0.305 0.449 0.359 0.223
Tariffs -1.871 -0.211* -0.058 -0.333 2.323 -1.837 -1.477 -3.395
Start-up costs -0.050* -0.046* -0.014 -0.013+ -0.024 -0.036 -0.040 (f) -0.118
Export docs -8.352* -2.994* -2.831 -0.459 -1.371 -6.187 -6.396+ -8.903+
Inflation -1.560 0.177 0.449 -0.642 -0.685 -1.084 -1.181 -2.979
Export/GDP -0.657 0.0181 -0.158 0.0432 -0.736 -0.497+ -0.615* (f) -0.486
Rule of law -1.117* 0.009 -0.188 -0.101 -0.612 -0.940+ -0.756 -1.475+
Telephones 1.589 0.341* -0.0239 0.160 0.772 0.906 0.951 1.210
FDI 1.188 1.156* 0.698 0.0804 -3.963 1.289 0.738 0.138
DOil 40.22 7.274* 9.747 2.315 31.25 28.27 29.62 32.38
DSSA 53.61+ 6.295* 8.649 13.44+ 27.76 44.43 45.29 (f) 134.5*
DSA 34.62 21.56* 17.62 16.14 -3.334 29.65 21.70 (f) 87.49
DNA 212.5* 248.6* 168.7* 363.3* 74.21 177.7* 234.9* (f) 62.66
DMENA 74.95* 46.26* 27.56 19.11* -18.36 63.44* 66.67* (f) 106.3*
DLAC 45.47* 9.702* 17.65 13.46+ 48.96 33.07 42.52 (f) 78.49+
DEAP 116.2* 3.971* 17.11 9.098 102.1 87.41* 106.5* (f) 110.0*
Capital stock 0.017*
Investment 1.776
Savings 0.414
Pop. 0.005
Ki 9.978
Herfindahl -124.5
Afgricultural empl. 0.934
Industrial empl. 3.846+
Primary school 5.924
Secondary school 15.90+
Export volatility 13.48
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 102
Significance level: + p<0.1 * p<0.05
The impact of the variables on deviations in “big hits” differ between quantiles and also
differ considerably from the OLS results. While the OLS result implies that initial income has
a negative impact on deviations, looking only at the OLS result would be misleading since
initial income has a significant impact only at the 20% and 70% quantile regressions with
different magnitudes. Model averaging results confirm the negative impact of initial income
level. Size of an economy or GDP appears to have a positive impact on deviations but quantile
results show that size has a negative impact and significant impact at the lowest quantile where
deviations are small and negative. Size, however, is not identified as robust as shown by WALS
results.
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Although country capabilities have positive and significant impact on deviations in “big
hits” at the 90% quantile, they have a negative significant effects at lower quantiles. Model
averaging also found this negative effect and it is significant as a focus regressor. Since this
measure of country capabilities is synonymous with product diversification, it follows that
countries that have very large positive deviations in “big hits” benefit from an increase in di-
versification. Contrarily, where deviations are negative, diversification does not encourage “big
hits”; this result is plausible since “big hits” are by definition large export flows, hence, diver-
sifying too much would not facilitate the formation of large exports. Product ubiquity impacts
deviations negatively but is significant for the OLS regression and is robust to model averaging
estimations with and without focus regressors. In simple words, the more a certain product is
popular, the worse will it perform in terms of deviations in “big hits”.
Centrality in the network (betweenness) has a consistent negative and significant impact
on deviations. However, the extent of the impact differs between low and high quantiles. The
negative impact is strongly robust to the OLS and model averaging estimation techniques. The
betweenness centrality measure takes the number of connections, which reflects diversifica-
tion, as a core element in its computation, as such, the negative impact is thus consistent with
the diversification argument explained above.15
Financial development (private credit) has a positive impact on deviations at the highest
quantiles where there are positive deviations while a negative and significant impact at the
20% quantile. This implies that more developed manufacturers or “big hits” are more likely to
benefit from well-developed financial structure than the less developed ones or “smaller hits".
Beck et al. (2008), using a firm level survey covering about 3000 firms in 48 countries, find that
small firms are less able to take advantage of external finance than larger firms, hence if we
assume that small firms are less likely to be “big hits", Beck’s et al. reasoning can explain our
result. Moreover, they also find that less-developed institutions negatively impact the use of
external finance so that small firms resort to informal finance. In our data, we find a positive
correlation between rule of law and financial development for lower quantiles to support such
an argument. Results are not robust to model averaging estimations.
Tariffs on manufactured goods have a negative impact on deviations but only significant at
lower quantiles. The result is not robust and points towards the ineffectiveness of direct and
obsolete policy measures as warned by Rodrik (2004). We expect cost of starting a business to
negatively affect deviations. We observe a significant effect at the lowest and the 70% quantiles
and at the OLS. Being a "policy" measure reflecting ease of doing business, we include it as
a focus regressor in WALS_f; while it has the expected sign, it has low probability of inclu-
sion. Interestingly, the number of export documents required has the same negative effect and
appears to be a robust estimator as shown by the WALS results.
Openness to trade, as measured by share of exports to GDP, has mixed effects but model
averaging confirms their negative impact on deviations. Contrary to common and academic
belief (Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005; Barro, 2001), rule of law which reflects a sound institutional
and legal system negatively influences deviations and is a robust estimator.
The effect of FDI on deviations is also mixed: while it exerts a significant positive impact
15See appendix for a formal definition of this measure.
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at low quantiles, it has a negative effect at the highest quantile but is not robust to model
averaging. In other words, FDI positively affects countries that are lagging behind in “big hits”
but is detrimental to countries that are already well-performing. The former result is well-
explained by the FDI-led growth in developing countries literature (Blomstrom et al., 1994).
Recent empirical studies may explain the latter result, for instance, using robust mixed fixed
random estimator Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) find that the effect of FDI on growth
suffers from considerable heterogeneity.
The estimated coefficients of the regional dummies show that they are doing better than
the reference region EU-Central Asia16. North America is the best performing region followed
by East Asia Pacific region and Middle East and North Africa region; they are robust to model
averaging estimation.
Clustering coefficient, inflation, basic telecommunication development (telephones) and
the Oil dummy (DOil) appear not to matter. The model averaging estimation with the re-
stricted sample identifies capital stock, the percentage of employment in industry and years of
secondary schooling as positive determinants of deviations.
4.5 Panel regressions
Table 8 Panel regressions: dependent variable: deviation in Big Hits
Fixed effects Random effects Random effects - regions
Initial income -0.001* (-3.05) -0.001* (-4.09) -0.001* (-4.43)
GDP -7.041* (-2.16) -3.780 (-1.61) -4.501* (-1.98)
Capabilities -0.085* (-9.35) -0.095* (-11.1) -0.094* (-11.0)
Prod. ubiquity -0.467 (-1.58) -0.552+ (-1.89) -0.541+ (-1.86)
Between. Centr 279.5 (0.81) 297.9 (0.88) 239.4 (0.70)
Export/GDP -0.042 (-0.63) -0.077 (-1.21) -0.0619 (-0.97)
Rule of law 0.085 (0.97) 0.036 (0.44) 0.017 (0.20)
DSSA 29.03+ (1.72)
DSA 1.960 (0.07)
DNA 374.1* (7.17)
DMENA 51.15* (2.60)
DLAC 43.02* (2.46)
DEAP 51.16* (2.86)
Observations 2131 2131 2131
Hausman test(p-value) 9.64 (0.09) 9.64 (0.09) 9.35 (0.10)
Breusch-Pagan LM test 11006* (0.00) 11006* (0.00)
p-values in parentheses, significance level: + p<0.1 * p<0.05
While the use of cross-sectional quantile regressions alongside model averaging estimations
provide a complete picture of the forces at work as regards the performance of countries in
terms of deviations in “big hits” from the established benchmark, the results are constrained
by the limited amount of observations and the possible effects of unobservable components.
Hence, we further explore our results by estimating panel regressions using the robust vari-
ables we identified from the cross-sectional results. The underlying specification is a model of
the form:
BHDev.it = αi + βθXit +uit
16except for Middle East and North Africa(MENA) and South Asia(SA) at the 90% quantile.
22
where Xit represents the set of variables, initial income, GDP, capabilities, product ubiquity,
betweenness centrality, export/GDP, rule of law and regional dummies (where specified), i = 1
to 169 and t = 1995 to 2011.
Figure 9 illustrates the trends in deviations for a sample of countries. While USA shows a
declining trend from the year 2000 onwards, China’s deviations in big hits have kept increasing
over the 1995-2011 period. Italy’s deviations are peristently negative and worsen towards the
end of the period.
Table 8 shows the results of the panel regressions. Hausman test favours the random over
the fixed effects model at 5% significance level. Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test favour
the random effects model over the OLS; we nevertheless show the fixed effects result to facil-
itate sensitivity analysis. Indeed, the coefficients of the fixed and random effects differ as is
expected when the hausman test reject the null-hypothesis of no correlation of the error term
with the regressors (Hausman, 1978). Results concord with cross-sectional results except for
GDP which shows a clear negative impact on deviations, in other words, larger economies have
negative deviations. This is probably due to the fact that larger economies tend to diversify
more than expected and this reduces the occurrences of "big hits". Contrarily to the cross-
sectional results, betweenness centrality shows a positive sign but is not significant. Share of
export to GDP and rule of law are not significant in the panel approach. Regions matter as
evidenced by their positive and significant coefficients of the regional dummies in the random
effects model-with regions (save South Asia).
Figure 9 Patterns of deviations in Big Hits for selected countries 1995-2011
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that a simple stochastic model of proportionate growth is not only able
to match a number of stylised facts documented in the literature but it also reconciles diverg-
ing views in the economic development literature as regards the potential merits of industrial
policy. On the one hand, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) argue for industrial policy that would
lead to successful export-led growth. Growth is achieved by subsidising discovery efforts that
would be under-supplied in an unregulated market. On the other hand, Easterly et al. (2009)
argues against policies aimed at picking winners as they are likely to be unsuccessful given
that the distribution of exports is fat-tailed, that is, “big hits” are rare. Our model suggests that
the probability of drawing a big hit is larger for countries that engage in more discovery ef-
forts, that is, trying to establish more trade links. It, thus, brings together the above mentioned
diverging views regarding industrial policy.
We exploit the model as a benchmark against which we evaluate the export performance of
different countries in terms of big hits. Given the number of export relationship of each coun-
try and the skewed distribution of export values, we can derive (by simulations) an expected
number of big hits for each country. These represent the “normal” performance of countries
according to our model. By comparing actual and expected “big hits” we can define whether
countries perform better or worse than the benchmark. Interestingly, we find that most Eu-
ropean countries (save Germany and Ireland) underperform, while the best performers are no
surprise and include countries such as China, Germany, USA and Japan which have a solid
manufacturing sector. At the bottom of the list appears many of the countries that have been
hit by the recent financial crisis, or are plagued by structural problems such as Italy and Spain.
What are the reasons behind the good and bad performance of countries in terms of big
hits? The use of quantile regressions provide some insights into the determinants of these
deviations. It further shows that countries are heterogeneous so that the impact of many vari-
ables are different for countries that are at the bottom of the list from those that are at the
top. We check the robustness of our results with the recently developed model averaging es-
timation WALS. Initial income, country capabilities, product ubiquity, betweenness centrality,
financial development, openness of an economy and rule of law negatively affect deviations
in “big hits”. The regional dummies, North America, Middle East and North Africa, and East
Asia Pacific positively affect deviations and perform better than EU-Central Asia. We further
confirm these results by adopting a panel method over 15 years and the results strongly em-
phasise the positive impact of regions on deviations. Further research is needed to identify the
policy actions that can revamp competitiveness and help European countries to improve their
performance.
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A Appendix
A.1 List of variables and their description
• Initial Income is GDP per capita at PPP (constant 2005 international $) in logarithm
for the year 1995 which is the beginning of the period under consideration (source from
World Development Indicators (WDI)).
• GDP represents the size of the economy. It is total GDP amount in logarithm for each
country at constant US$.
• Country capabilities is calculated as in Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) ,
kc,0 =
∑
p
Mcp
i.e. the diversification of country c as the sum of Mcp over all products p where
Mcp = 1 if country c exports product p with a Revealed Comparative Advantage above 1,
Mcp = 0 otherwise. We use our own data and average the figure for each country.
• Product ubiquity is also taken from Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) and represents the
pervasiveness of the products of a country,
kp,0 =
∑
c
Mcp
• Between. centr., following Jackson (2008), is defined as
∑
ij:i,j,k<ij
Pij(k)
Pij
where Pij denotes the number of shortest paths from node i to j and Pij(k) denotes the
number of shortest paths from node i to j that node k lies on. It is a measure of the
importance of a country based on its connections.
• Clustering, where the clustering coefficient of a node is the probability that two ran-
domly selected neighbours are connected to each other. The clustering coefficient Cc of
node i:
Cc(A) =
∑
j,i;k,j;k,i
AjiAikAjk∑
j,i;k,j;k,i
AjiAik
• Private credit is credit from all financial institutions and sourced from the Financial De-
velopment and Structure Dataset, World Bank developed by Beck et al. (2000). The April
2013 version has been used. The variable is Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and
Other Financial Institutions to GDP (%) which is defined as claims on the private sector
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions divided by GDP. As described in
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Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009), this asset side variable captures one of the most impor-
tant function of financial intermediaries, that is, allocation of credit.
• Tariffs is average tariff rate on manufactured products (%) (source WDI).
• Start-up costs represents costs of business start-up procedures as a percentage of gross
national income per capita (source WDI).
• Export docs is simply the number of documents required per shipment to export goods
such as documents required for clearance by government ministries, customs authorities,
port and container terminal authorities, health and technical control agencies and banks
are taken into account. It is an ease of doing business indicator.
• Inflation is used to capture changes in the price level. It reflects annual percentage
changes in consumer prices (source WDI).
• Export/GDP is a standard indicator of openness to trade (source WDI).
• Rule of law, percentile rank, is a World Governance Indicator, World Bank.
• Telephones captures technological development (source WDI).
• FDI is net inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in current US$ in logarithm (source WDI).
• DOil is a dummy variable capturing whether a country is a significant oil-producer, that
is, its oil rents is more than 40% of its GDP (source WDI).
• DSSA, DSA, DNA, DMENA, DLAC and DEAP are regional dummy variables representing
regions as per the WDI 7 regions classification, namely, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia,
North America, M. East & N. Africa, Latin Ame & Caribbeans, East Asia Pacific .
• Capital Stock, Investment and Savings are capital stocks in billions constant 2005 $US,
investment rate as a percentage of GDP, Savings rate as a percentage of GDP respectively
(source CEPII Econmap baseline database 2.1).
• Pop. is population density (people per sq. km of land area) (source WDI).
• Ki is the number of product-destinations in logarithm.
• Agricultural and Industrial empl. represent employment in the agricultural sector and
employment in industry (% of total employment) respectively (source WDI).
• Primary school and Secondary school are years of primary schooling and secondary
schooling for population aged 15 and over respectively (source (Barro and Lee, 2012)).
• Export volatility is the standard deviation in export growth from 1995 to 2005 (calcu-
lated using data from BACI database).
All the variables are for the year 2005 except where specified above. To maximise the
number of observations, where data was missing for the year 2005, averages of previous
and successive years were used.
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A.2 List of all countries with simulated and empirical big hits, and the actual de-
viations between simulated and empirical big hits
Country Empi. Simul. Dev. Country Empi. Simul. Dev.
Afghanistan 0 * 3 -3 Kenya 1 37 -36
Albania 0 9 -9 Kiribati 0 * 0 0
Algeria 1 7 -6 Kuwait 1 13 -12
Andorra 0 6 -6 Kyrgyzstan 0 7 -7
Angola 0 * 3 -3 Lao P. D. Rep. 0 5 -5
Antigua & Barbu. 1 3 -2 Latvia 1 52 -51
Argentina 9 104 -95 Lebanon 0 62 -62
Armenia 1 * 6 -5 Liberia 3 1 2
Australia 62 228 -166 Libya 0 * 2 -2
Austria 81 359 -278 Lithuania 1 83 -82
Azerbaijan 1 8 -7 Madagascar 0 11 -11
Bahamas 4 * 3 1 Malawi 0 * 3 -3
Bahrain 1 19 -18 Malaysia 164 243 -79
Bangladesh 18 38 -20 Maldives 0 * 2 -2
Barbados 0 8 -8 Mali 0 * 5 -5
Belarus 10 46 -36 Malta 6 19 -13
Belgium-Lux. 240 514 -274 Marshall Isds 2 * 1 1
Belize 0 * 3 -3 Mauritania 0 * 1 -1
Benin 1 * 3 -2 Mauritius 3 25 -22
Bermuda 1 * 1 0 Mexico 236 181 55
Bhutan 0 * 1 -1 Mongolia 0 5 -5
Bolivia 0 10 -10 Morocco 8 55 -47
Bosnia Herz. 1 25 -24 Mozambique 4 * 3 1
Brazil 95 253 -158 Myanmar 2 8 -6
Brunei Darus. 0 * 3 -3 Nauru 0 * 0 0
Bulgaria 3 104 -101 Nepal 0 11 -11
Burkina Faso 2 * 4 -2 Netherlands 267 543 -276
Burundi 0 * 1 -1 New Zealand 6 103 -97
Cambodia 7 15 -8 Nicaragua 3 * 8 -5
Cameroon 1 11 -10 Niger 1 * 4 -3
Canada 326 * 309 17 Nigeria 0 10 -10
Cape Verde 0 * 3 -3 Norway 28 165 -137
Cayman Isds 2 * 1 1 Oman 1 18 -17
Central Afr. Rep. 0 * 1 -1 Pakistan 9 101 -92
Chad 0 * 1 -1 Palau 0 * 0 0
Chile 26 59 -33 Panama 3 52 -49
China 1182 928 254 Papua No. Guinea 1 * 2 -1
China, HK 77 336 -259 Paraguay 0 7 -7
China, Macao 2 24 -22 Peru 8 44 -36
Colombia 4 69 -65 Philippines 76 96 -20
Comoros 0 * 1 -1 Pitcairn 0 * 0 0
Congo 0 * 3 -3 Poland 70 251 -181
Costa Rica 11 36 -25 Portugal 40 177 -137
Côte d’Ivoire 2 16 -14 Qatar 2 17 -15
Croatia 3 69 -66 Rep. Moldova 1 14 -13
Cuba 3 * 8 -5 Rep. of Korea 349 * 381 -32
Cyprus 0 27 -27 Romania 19 124 -105
Czech Rep. 67 256 -189 Russian Fed. 105 186 -81
D. P. Rep. Korea 0 22 -22 Rwanda 0 * 2 -2
D. Rep. Congo 0 2 -2 Samoa 0 * 1 -1
Denmark 39 313 -274 Sao Tome & Prin. 0 * 1 -1
Djibouti 0 2 -2 Saudi Arabia 34 94 -60
Dominica 0 * 2 -2 Senegal 1 17 -16
Dominican Rep. 10 19 -9 Seychelles 0 * 2 -2
Ecuador 0 24 -24 Sierra Leone 0 * 3 -3
31
Country Empi. Simul. Dev. Country Empi. Simul. Dev.
Egypt 4 72 -68 Singapore 158 279 -121
El Salvador 4 23 -19 Slovakia 24 114 -90
Equator. Guinea 1 * 1 0 Slovenia 8 126 -118
Eritrea 0 * 1 -1 Solomon Isds 0 * 0 0
Estonia 2 60 -58 Somalia 0 * 1 -1
Ethiopia 0 4 -4 Spain 150 529 -379
Fiji 0 11 -11 Sri Lanka 4 48 -44
Finland 62 213 -151 Sudan 0 * 3 -3
Fr. S. Antarctic T. 0 * 0 0 Suriname 2 * 3 -1
France 416 720 -304 Sweden 119 353 -234
FS Micronesia 0 * 0 0 Switzerland 133 413 -280
Gabon 1 5 -4 Syria 0 40 -40
Gambia 0 2 -2 Tajikistan 2 * 2 0
Georgia 1 10 -9 TFYR of
Macedonia
0 20 -20
Germany 1072 902 170 Thailand 135 302 -167
Ghana 1 12 -11 Timor-Leste 0 2 -2
Gibraltar 0 * 1 -1 Togo 0 8 -8
Greece 3 133 -130 Tokelau 0 * 1 -1
Greenland 0 * 1 -1 Tonga 0 * 0 0
Grenada 0 * 1 -1 Trinidad & Toba. 2 21 -19
Guatemala 5 36 -31 Tunisia 9 50 -41
Guinea 1 * 3 -2 Turkey 66 366 -300
Guinea-Bissau 0 * 0 0 Turkmenistan 0 2 -2
Guyana 0 4 -4 Tuvalu 0 * 0 0
Haiti 2 * 2 0 UAE 19 263 -244
Honduras 8 * 15 -7 Uganda 0 8 -8
Hungary 71 170 -99 Ukraine 28 106 -78
Iceland 3 18 -15 United Kingdom 322 714 -392
India 42 495 -453 Uruguay 0 23 -23
Indonesia 72 222 -150 USA 1079 860 219
Iran 5 54 -49 Utd Rep.
Tanzania
0 11 -11
Iraq 0 2 -2 Uzbekistan 4 * 6 -2
Ireland 166 135 31 Vanuatu 0 * 0 0
Israel 21 144 -123 Venezuela 13 32 -19
Italy 307 787 -480 Viet Nam 24 107 -83
Jamaica 3 10 -7 Yemen 0 5 -5
Japan 876 478 398 Zambia 8 * 5 3
Jordan 4 34 -30 Zimbabwe 0 8 -8
Kazakhstan 14 * 18 -4
Values marked with an * indicates that the empirical big hits fall within the 95% CI of the simulated big hits
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